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Article 
The Ineludible (Constitutional) Politics of Guns 
J. RICHARD BROUGHTON 
The murders at Newtown intensified the American political 
debate about guns—a debate that often fits within the framework of 
a larger national conversation about violent crime and the political 
approaches to addressing it.  Yet the gun control debate has resulted 
in a strange but fascinating intersection of law and politics, 
particularly law and politics of the constitutional sort, when we 
consider where the historical political battle lines have been drawn 
on matters of crime and punishment.  This Article explores that 
intersection, giving special attention to the law and politics of 
federalism as reflected in the narrative concerning the 
“overfederalization” of crime.  Rather than focusing on gun rights 
and the Second Amendment, then, this paper focuses on Congress’s 
power to create federal gun crimes using the authority of the 
Commerce Clause.  The Article traces the relevant Supreme Court 
and lower court decisions and evaluates the state of Commerce 
Clause litigation involving federal gun possession crimes.  The 
Article ultimately suggests that, because federalism has become a 
consistent theme of Roberts Court jurisprudence, firearms-related 
litigation could be a vehicle for Commerce Clause-based federalism 
to reemerge as a mechanism for cabining federal criminal law-
making power.  This would be appealing to those, particularly on the 
political Right, who favor sensible gun controls and have a 
comparatively narrow view of gun rights, but who are also troubled 
by the contemporary scope of federal criminal law powers.
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The Ineludible (Constitutional) Politics of Guns 
J. RICHARD BROUGHTON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“This is not about politics.”1  Those were the words of President 
Barack Obama in Hartford, amidst his push for more restrictive gun 
regulation following the horrific murders at Newtown, Connecticut, in 
December 2012.2  And yet, after many years of remaining mostly at the 
periphery, violent crime has reemerged as a subject of serious national 
political conversation.  In substantial part, that conversation has occurred 
as a result of the Newtown murders3 and other recent high-profile crime 
stories.  The trial of George Zimmerman in Florida state court has 
launched a national debate on self-defense law and policy, as well as the 
scope of federal hate crimes legislation.4  The national crime conversation 
also received a jolt after the Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013 and 
the capture of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, whose case—although framed largely 
in the context of terrorism—is sparking renewed debates about the death 
                                                                                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law.  I am grateful to the 
Connecticut Law Review for hosting an important Symposium and for having me as a participant.  I 
thank Rachael Soren for her many hours of research, comments, and conversation about this Article 
and gun politics in general.  I also thank Conor Fitzpatrick for additional research and editorial 
assistance.  I presented earlier versions of this Article at the Law and Legal Education in the Americas 
Symposium and the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and Letters Annual Meeting.  I am grateful 
for the helpful comments I received at those conferences. 
1 Remarks at the University of Hartford in Hartford, Connecticut, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
227, at 4 (Apr. 8, 2013). 
2 Id.  
3 See, e.g., Ben Lefebvre, New NRA President Vows to Take Gun-Control Fight into Next 
Election, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873247666
04578463001022323518 (noting the NRA’s opposition to President Obama’s push for gun regulation 
following Newtown); Pema Levy, Six Months After Newtown, Connecticut—A New Political 
Landscape on Guns, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 14, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/six-months-after-
newtown-connecticut-new-political-landscape-guns-1307111 (suggesting that Newtown prompted a 
flood of new legislation). 
4 See, e.g., “Stand Your Ground Laws”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil 
Rights, and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Oct. 29, 2013) (statement of 
Ronald S. Sullivan Jr., Clinical Professor of Law, Director of the Criminal Justice Institute, Harvard 
Law School) (arguing that Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law “emboldened Mr. Zimmerman to 
disregard the command of the 911 dispatcher”); Jay Weaver et al., Civil-Rights Leaders Call on Justice 
Department to Act, MIAMI HERALD (July 14, 2013), www.miamiherald.com/2013/07/14/3500052/feder
al-case-against-zimmerman.html (detailing the outcry of civil rights leaders following the Zimmerman 
verdict). 
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penalty.5  These stories all have something in common: they all involved 
the use of a firearm.6  Perhaps no issue has pushed crime into the national 
political conversation more than firearm violence.  Whether the issue of 
controlling gun crime is about politics or something else, evidence 
suggests that it has been nearly impossible to remove politics from the 
criminal justice policy debate.   
Moreover, the politics of firearms are somewhat unusual, at least when 
one considers the conventional battle lines between the political Left and 
the political Right on crime and constitutional issues.  After all, 
conventional wisdom held that “liberals” were associated with the effort to 
achieve expanded individual rights under the Constitution and 
“conservatives” were generally opposed such expansions—at least where 
the rights were not enumerated in the Constitution or found in American 
social and political traditions.7  In this account, liberals were seen as more 
skeptical of law enforcement, while conservatives were considered law 
enforcement’s champions in politics and in the judiciary.8  Further, in the 
Supreme Court’s incorporation cases regarding criminal procedure rights, 
it was conservatives like Justice Harlan who often argued that the states 
play an important intermediary role in American political structure and 
                                                                                                                          
5 Rebekah Metzler, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Capture Reignites Death Penalty Debate, Top Democrats 
Call for Death Penalty Following Boston Bombings, Citing Federal Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Apr. 22, 2013), www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/22/dzhokhar-tsarnev-capture-reignites-death-
penalty-debate. 
6 While it is true that Tsarnaev allegedly committed his act with an explosive device, such devices 
are included in the definition of a “firearm” for the purposes of applying 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), pursuant 
to which he has now been indicted.  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3), (4) (2012). 
7 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 72–74 (1990) (criticizing the Warren Court’s liberalism and its expansion of rights); DAVID E. 
MARION, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN JR.: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF 
“LIBERTARIAN DIGNITY” 164–67 (1997) (summarizing Justice Brennan’s jurisprudence, as well as his 
views on individual rights and the role courts play in protecting them); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, 
Is There a Distinctive Conservative Jurisprudence?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (2002) (laying 
out the conventional distinction between judicial liberals and judicial conservatives).  
8 E.g., Madhavi M. McCall & Michael A. McCall, Chief Justice William Rehnquist: His Law-
and-Order Legacy and Impact on Criminal Justice, 39 AKRON L. REV. 323, 332 (2006); see also 
Morgan Cloud, A Conservative House United: How the Post-Warren Court Dismantled the 
Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 477, 478 (2013) (explaining how the political biases of 
justices influenced the Supreme Court’s application of the exclusionary rule); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
The Constitution and the Police: Individual Rights and Law Enforcement, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 12–16 
(1988) (discussing the range of decision-making on the Warren and Burger Courts); cf. Eric J. Miller, 
The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2010) 
(arguing that the Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases should be viewed through the lens of civic 
republican concerns about personal security rather than as rights-expanding cases).  This Article duly 
recognizes that common political terminology is difficult to define precisely, particularly when 
discussing Supreme Court decision-making. 
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thus need flexibility to respond to local needs in administering their 
systems of criminal justice.9   
Gun rights have turned this usual paradigm on its head, with 
conservatives joining libertarians in advocating for more expansive 
interpretations of the Second Amendment and its incorporation into the 
Fourteenth Amendment—thereby making it enforceable against the 
states.10  Meanwhile, liberals are seen as more tolerant of harsh criminal 
laws and aggressive law enforcement where guns are concerned.11  It 
remains unclear exactly why conventional wisdom has evolved to describe 
the protection of gun rights as an especially conservative posture, as 
opposed to a libertarian one.  It is easy to imagine a world in which prudent 
controls on gun possession and use would fit more naturally with 
conservative intuitions about good social order and sensible restraints on 
human conduct.  But perhaps the particular brand of conservatism matters.   
In any event, the current Left/Right dynamic on gun control issues may 
also be part of a broader conflict among those with Right-leaning politics.  
This conflict has been described as the difference between a judicial 
conservatism that normally is skeptical of judicial intervention and a new 
kind of “constitutional conservatism” that more robustly embraces judicial 
review, particularly to protect certain kinds of rights.12  A fear among 
conservatives of the more traditional stripe, though, may be that others 
associated with the Right are championing constitutional conservatism 
while simultaneously elevating rights (with respect to guns, in particular) 
in ways that the Constitution does not.13  Their somewhat abstract “liberty” 
talk seems at odds with the more Burkean style of conservatism that is not 
averse to, but in fact favors, tolerable restraints, respect for old habits and 
                                                                                                                          
9 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174–76 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting 
the Fourteenth Amendment was created with the intent of eventually allowing states to have an 
intermediary role); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680–81 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (depicting a 
view that the states should have some control in dealing with their own individual law enforcement 
problems). 
10 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (showing that Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Roberts joined the majority opinion written by Justice Alito, which recognized the 
incorporation of the Second Amendment, and that Justice Thomas concurred in judgment). 
11 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Putting the Gun Control Debate in Social Perspective, 73 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 477, 477–78 (2004) (highlighting the irony of the conservative and liberal agendas regarding 
the Second Amendment).  
12 A full assessment of this interesting dichotomy is well beyond the scope of this piece.  For now, 
see Josh Blackman, Epps on Reagan v. The Libertarians on the Supreme Court, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Sept. 16, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/09/16/epps-reagan-v-libertarians-supreme-
court, and Garrett Epps, Reagan’s Court v. The Libertarians’, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 16, 2013), 
http://prospect.org/article/reagans-court-v-libertarians.  For a thoughtful discussion of the different 
types of conservatism as judicial review may reflect them, see Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and 
Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1141–42 (2002). 
13 See Young, supra note 12, at 1185–86 (highlighting conflicts among conservatives regarding 
constitutionalism).  
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institutions, and an appreciation for liberty moderated by good social 
order.14  Yet despite their public statements about the scope of Second 
Amendment protection, many of those same leaders on the political Right 
have been forced to grapple with two distinct realities: first, that violent 
crime committed with guns is highly prevalent in this country15 and 
demands the attention of the law; and second, that the Second 
Amendment’s protection, however venerable, is limited.   
District of Columbia v. Heller,16 which recognized that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual “right to keep and bear arms,”17 may 
have seemed meaningfully libertarian at first blush.  But the decision might 
actually lend little hope to the more libertarian view for which many on the 
political Right have recently advocated.  Ironically, perhaps, this is because 
Heller possesses somewhat conservative qualities.  “Somewhat” is an apt 
qualifier, because there is a compelling argument that Heller could have 
been far more conservative—not by broadening Second Amendment 
protection, but by actually rejecting an individual right to bear arms.  
Multiple critics of Heller have made this argument.18  Some, like Judge J. 
Harvie Wilkinson, have even likened Heller to Roe v. Wade.19   
That criticism aside, though, whatever more libertarian instincts may 
have been aroused in the first few pages of Heller were mostly squelched 
later in the opinion.  Which is to say, although Heller was not especially 
conservative, neither was it especially libertarian.  After all, Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion not only tries to locate the individual right to bear 
                                                                                                                          
14 See RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO ELIOT 8–9 (7th rev. ed. 2001) 
(enumerating six canons of conservative thought); see also RUSSELL KIRK, THE POLITICS OF 
PRUDENCE 17–25, 156–71 (1993) (discussing conservative principles and distinguishing conservatism 
from libertarianism).  For more on Burkean thought, see generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON 
THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Liberal Arts Press 1955) (1790). 
15 Gun Violence, NAT’L INST. JUST., http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/gun-
violence/Pages/welcome.aspx (last updated Apr. 4, 2013). 
16 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
17 Id. at 595.  
18 See Carl T. Bogus, Heller and Insurrectionism, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 253, 262 (2008) 
(suggesting that the Heller court, like other modern conservatives, deviated from traditional 
conservatism); David A. Strauss, The Death of Judicial Conservatism, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 11–12 (2009) (arguing that the conservatives on the Heller court declined to follow principles 
of conservatism); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. 
L. REV. 253, 254 (2009) (suggesting that Heller was a failure for conservatives). 
19 Wilkinson, supra note 18, at 254–55.  Judge Wilkinson also argued that Heller and Roe were 
different in important ways—not the least of which was that Heller interpreted the scope of a right that 
is actually enumerated in the Constitution, whereas the same cannot be said of Roe.  Id.  He 
acknowledged, “So Heller is not Roe.  But to say that Heller was marginally more justified than Roe is 
not saying much—surely the bar of justification for judicial intervention has not been set so low.”  Id. 
at 266.  For responses from the Right to Judge Wilkinson’s critique, see generally Alan Gura, Heller 
and the Triumph of Originalist Judicial Engagement: A Response to Judge Harvie Wilkinson, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1127 (2009), and Nelson Lund & David B. Kopel, Unraveling Judicial Restraint: Guns, 
Abortion, and the Faux Conservatism of J. Harvie Wilkinson III, 25 J.L. & POL. 1, 2 (2009). 
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arms in the Constitution’s text, history, and structure, but also enumerates 
several limits on the scope of that right.20  According to the Heller 
majority, the Second Amendment casts no constitutional doubt upon 
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive public 
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”21  The 
majority identified another limit, drawn from the Court’s language in 
United States v. Miller,22 that the Second Amendment does not protect the 
carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”23  Justice Scalia was 
unclear as to the precise scope of this latter limitation, though he gave the 
example of “M-16 rifles and the like.”24  But in media interviews after the 
release of his most recent book, Justice Scalia has intimated that such a 
limit could extend to assault weapons or other types of firearms, and that 
“locational limitations” may also be valid, thus further constraining the 
reach of Heller.25  Curiously, then, Heller may have pulled the libertarian 
rug out from under itself. 
Moreover, lower courts have generally been adamant about enforcing 
the limits on the right to keep and bear arms that Heller recognized.26  
Consider, for example, the cases attacking federal crimes involving 
prohibited firearm possession.  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), it is 
unlawful for certain categories of persons to possess a firearm that enters 
or affects interstate commerce, or to receive any firearm that has been 
shipped or transported in interstate commerce.27  Those prohibited 
categories of persons include felons and the mentally ill, as described in 
Heller.28  But there are numerous other categories, including: fugitives, 
unlawful users of or those addicted to prohibited controlled substances, 
unlawful aliens, persons dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces, 
those who have renounced their citizenship, and persons convicted of 
misdemeanor domestic violence.29  Clearly, these categories can venture 
                                                                                                                          
20 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
21 Id.  
22 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939). 
23 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
24 Id.  
25 John Aloysius Farrell, Scalia: Guns May Be Regulated, NAT’L J. (July 29, 2012), 
www.nationaljournal.com/scalia-guns-may-be-regulated-20120729. 
26 See, e.g., Powell v. Tompkins, 926 F. Supp. 2d 367, 380 (D. Mass. 2013) (upholding a 
proscription on granting gun licenses to people under age twenty-one); Young v. Hawaii, 911 F. Supp. 
2d 972, 990 (D. Haw. 2012) (finding a statute restricting the public carrying of a firearm to be 
constitutional); Schrader v. Holder, 831 F. Supp. 2d 304, 311–12 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding a statute 
prohibiting gun possession by a felon). 
27 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). 
28 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
29 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2)–(9). 
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beyond those specifically enumerated in Heller.  And yet lower federal 
courts have consistently held that the Second Amendment does not protect 
the right of a person in one of those categories to possess any firearm, even 
a handgun or rifle.30  Courts have also consistently upheld federal criminal 
laws prohibiting the possession of firearms with an obliterated serial 
number,31 the possession of a machine gun,32 possession by a juvenile,33 
and sale of a firearm to a juvenile34—all categories that appear to go 
beyond the literal terms of Heller’s limitations. 
It is hard to ignore the parallels between Heller and Lawrence v. 
Texas,35 the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision that at least seemed to offer 
constitutional protection for private, consensual sex between adults.36  Like 
its counterpart in substantive due process, Heller looks like one of those 
cases whose libertarian potential seemed strong but waned once lower 
courts were given the opportunity to interpret its scope.37  Like Lawrence, 
Heller devoted an important paragraph near its conclusion to articulating 
meaningful limits on the right that it purportedly recognized.38  And just as 
                                                                                                                          
30 See, e.g., United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 592 (3d Cir. 2012) (reversing the district court’s 
finding that the statute violated the Second Amendment rights of a person who was charged with aiding 
and abetting the possession of a firearm by a felon); United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 
442 (5th Cir. 2011) (upholding the constitutionality of a law prohibiting illegal aliens from possessing 
firearms); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 13–14 (1st Cir. 2011) (refusing to allow individuals 
convicted of an offense with a mens rea of recklessness to carry a firearm); United States v. Yancey, 
621 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding the constitutionality of the statute as applied against 
illegal drug users); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 920, 925 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding the statute to 
survive a constitutional challenge by a man convicted for possession of two pistols and two shotguns 
while being an unlawful drug user); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 639, 645 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(finding a man’s conviction for possessing a pistol, a rifle, and a shotgun while on probation for his 
second domestic violence charge to be constitutional). 
31 E.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 87 (3d Cir. 2010). 
32 E.g., United States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 996 
(2013). 
33 E.g., United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 2009). 
34 See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 714 F.3d 334, 
335 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (indicating that the Court “declined to consider en banc the 
constitutionality, under the Supreme Court’s recent Second Amendment decisions, of federal laws 
barring licensed gun dealers from selling handguns or handgun ammunition to people less than 21 years 
old”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1364 (2014).  
35 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
36 Id. at 578. 
37 For a valuable list of extensive lower court case law that has refused to find rights protected 
under Lawrence, see J. Kelly Strader, Lawrence’s Criminal Law, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 41, 107–11 
(2011).  For an argument that Lawrence is not especially libertarian, see Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence 
Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1148–49 (2004), and J. Richard Broughton, The Criminalization 
of Consensual Adult Sex After Lawrence, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 
2014).  
38 Compare Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors.  It does not 
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent 
might not easily be refused.  It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.”), with District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008) (stating that “the right secured by the Second 
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most lower courts have been reluctant to extend the reach of the right 
recognized in Lawrence,39 so too have lower courts been reluctant to strike 
down gun restrictions on Second Amendment grounds.   
So for all of the political haggling over gun control, current gun 
politics cannot be understood entirely outside of the legal, or litigation, 
context.  This is not to say, though, that any constitutional challenge to gun 
control is necessarily libertarian, or otherwise inconsistent with a more 
Burkean form of conservatism.40  A challenge to some federal gun 
restrictions that is based on the limits to national legislative power would 
arguably fit far more comfortably into the conservative’s legal toolbox,41 
while still enabling conservatives to support gun control generally and 
specific gun restrictions that are better suited for state regulation.   
It is notable, then, that the existing constitutional and political debates 
over gun control also implicate a parallel constitutional and political 
debate: one about the scope of federal power to create criminal law.  This 
is the “overfederalization” problem that many commentators on both the 
Left and Right have identified.42  Instead of a debate about the Bill of 
Rights, the conservative side of the overfederalization debate is concerned 
with constitutional structure and the proper limits on Congress’s authority 
to define crimes that would traditionally fall within the power of the states 
to define and punish—that is, if criminalization is desirable in the first 
place.43  Not only has overfederalization reared its head in academic 
circles,44 but Congress has recently held multiple hearings on 
                                                                                                                          
Amendment is not unlimited” and that there are “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places, 
such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on 
commercial sales of arms”). 
39 See Strader, supra note 37, at 107–11 (providing a list of some criminal cases where Lawrence 
was “[i]napplicable”). 
40 See generally Ernest A. Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 874 (2006) (reconciling federalism and conservatism, and Burkean conservatism in particular). 
41 Id. at 883–85. 
42 See J. Richard Broughton, Congressional Inquiry and the Federal Criminal Law, 46 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 457, 460–64, 466–67 (2012) (describing the overfederalization phenomenon and why reform is 
a problem for scholars and commentators across the political spectrum). 
43 See John S. Baker, Jr., Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the 
Expansion of Federal Crimes, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 545, 546 (2005) (asserting that “[t]he constitutional 
allocation of power which leaves the general police powers in the states should mean that the federal 
role is much smaller”); J. Richard Broughton, Some Reflections on Conservative Politics and the Limits 
of the Criminal Sanction, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 537, 559 (2010) (“While the states still define, 
investigate, and prosecute the vast majority of crimes, the growth of the federal criminal code remains a 
subject of concern, especially for conservatives.”). 
44 See JOHN S. BAKER, JR., HERITAGE FOUND., REVISITING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL 
CRIMES (2008) (presenting a study that examines the correlation of federal crimes with the growth of 
federal criminal law); Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 
W. VA. L. REV. 789, 801 (1996) (contending that a problem exists “when Congress makes federal 
crimes of behavior already adequately covered by state law”); Baker, supra note 43, at 549–54 
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overcriminalization and overfederalization,45 with both Democrats and 
Republicans expressing concern over the size of federal criminal law and 
the scope of federal prosecutorial power.46  In the political Right’s view, 
the overfederalization problem has been stoked by congressional power 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which is used to justify much of federal 
criminal law.47  One might imagine that on the political Right, then, the 
constitutional assertion of primary importance in the gun control debate 
would focus first on federal power to enact and enforce gun restrictions.  A 
                                                                                                                          
(presenting an explanation for “the expansion of federal criminal law” and exploring its remedies); 
Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 801, 842 (1996) (asserting that “Congress continues undaunted down the road to federalize 
crime” and that “Lopez is a counterpoint to that trend”); see also Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of 
Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 
768 (2005) (explaining how overfederalization yields such problems as “nullification of both state 
procedural protections for criminal defendants and other laws expressing state policy”); Kathleen F. 
Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 
1136, 1172 (1995) (concluding that “[f]ederal duplication of state criminal law unduly burdens the 
federal justice system, which is ill-equipped to supplant local law enforcement”); Steven D. Clymer, 
Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 656 (1997) (indicating 
that the “duplicative federal criminal legislation is only one step in the process of federalization”); 
Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral 
Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1546 (1997) (observing “widespread agreement 
that Congress and the state legislatures have created too many new regulatory crimes”); Erik Luna, The 
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 708 (2005) (describing Congress’s adoption 
of “repetitive and overlapping statues”); Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: 
Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 503, 507 (1995) (arguing that “[t]he long-term solution to the federalization of state crime will 
come about through a rechanneling of Congress’s and the Executive Branch’s energies toward a 
coordinated effort with the states”).  But see Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Overfederalization of 
Criminal Law? It’s a Myth, 28 CRIM. JUST. 23, 24 (2013) (arguing that “[e]mpirical data . . . 
demonstrates that in spite of the large increase in number of federal criminal statutes during the past 
several decades, this growth in the federal code has generated little impact on federal resources or on 
the balance of power between state and federal courts”); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The 
Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 249–50 (1997) (arguing that 
commentators complaining of overfederalization overlook the federal government’s steady decline in 
criminal law enforcement).  For a thoughtful take on a related problem—namely, how expansive 
interpretations of the Commerce Clause have allowed for enactment of some conservative federal 
policies disfavored by liberals, thus leading some liberals to advocate for judicially-enforced 
federalism—see Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 509–10 (2006). 
45 Reining in Overcriminalization: Assessing the Problem, Proposing Solutions: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 111th 
Cong. 1–2, 236–39  (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Over-Criminalization Hearing]; Over-Criminalization of 
Conduct/Over-Federalization of Criminal Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, 
and Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 111th Cong. 1–2 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 
Over-Criminalization Hearing]. 
46 See, e.g., 2010 Over-Criminalization Hearing, supra note 45, at 1–2 (statement of Rep. Robert 
C. Scott) (lamenting the weakening of mens rea and the problem of vague statutes); 2009 Over-
Criminalization Hearing, supra note 45, at 3 (statement of Rep. Louie Gohmert) (lamenting that 
Congress has too often become “the arbiter of criminal conduct”). 
47 E.g., Broughton, supra note 42, at 467. 
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plausible argument exists—and thoughtful scholars have made it—for 
challenging many federal gun laws on Commerce Clause grounds.48  Many 
influential voices on the political Right, however, seem lately to have 
preferred, at least publicly, a strategy based on expanding Second 
Amendment rights.49   
This approach makes some sense, if the goal is to target gun control 
measures broadly.  It can be used to attack a greater number of gun laws, at 
both the state and federal level.  But it is also problematic for traditional 
conservatives (less so for libertarians), who have placed themselves in the 
odd political position of arguing for more expansive individual rights and 
against the interests of those in law enforcement who support stronger gun 
controls.  And, again, it is far from clear that the leading Supreme Court 
opinions on the Second Amendment reach as far as a libertarian view 
would extend them.  Conservatives, then, could employ Commerce Clause-
based federalism to attack some federal gun regulations while leaving 
others intact, all without ceding ground on aggressive criminal justice 
policies concerning violent crime.  The argument is simply that some gun 
restrictions are desirable, but that they cannot be imposed by the federal 
government; rather, they can—and should—be imposed by the states. 
So the debate about firearms and crime has resulted in a strange but 
fascinating intersection of law and politics, particularly law and politics of 
the constitutional sort.  This Article explores that intersection, giving 
special attention to the limits on federal gun control powers pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause.  It traces the relevant Supreme Court cases on federal 
criminal law, beginning in the 1970s and culminating in the existing battle 
                                                                                                                          
48 See David E. Engdahl, The Necessary and Proper Clause as an Intrinsic Restraint on Federal 
Lawmaking Power, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 115–16 (1998) (discussing the Commerce Clause 
arguments arising out of Lopez); David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously: 
Lopez and the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59, 80–82 (1997) (indicating that in 
“the context of firearms cases, some courts have strained particularly hard to find an interstate 
commerce nexus”); Dean A. Strang, Felons, Guns, and the Limits of Federal Power, 39 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 385, 386 (2006) (stating that the Court has never considered whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 
“lies within congressional prerogative under the Commerce Clause”); cf. Michael P. O’Shea, 
Federalism and the Implementation of the Right to Arms, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 201, 208 (2008) 
(observing that “both academic and judicial sources suggest that gun control is a ripe field for pro-
federalism arguments”). 
49 Consider, for example, that Republican Senators Ted Cruz, Rand Paul, and Mike Lee recently 
favored a filibuster of proposed gun control legislation on grounds that the proposals, including 
expanded background checks, implicated the Second Amendment.  Senator Cruz stated, “Any bill that 
would undermine the Bill of Rights, in my view, should be subject to a 60-vote threshold.”  Gregory 
Korte et al., Reid Schedules Vote to Break GOP Hold on Gun Bills, USA TODAY                                 
(Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/04/09/reid-mcconnell-guns-
filibuster-senate/2067877/ (internal quotation marks omitted).  Curiously, Senator Cruz did not say that 
legislation that would undermine the separation of powers or federalism should be subject to a sixty-
vote threshold; he only specified the protections of the Bill of Rights (in this case, the Second 
Amendment) as implicating that threshold. 
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over the vitality of United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison in 
light of Gonzalez v. Raich.  It then examines several lower federal court 
decisions in gun possession cases to demonstrate how federal judges have 
viewed the constitutional landscape on wholly intrastate gun possession 
after Lopez.  Whether the litigation focuses on the Second Amendment or 
the Commerce Clause, one truth emerges: the most consistent defenders of 
robust federal power to regulate guns have not been politicians, but rather, 
federal judges.  The Article thus critiques the state of Commerce Clause 
litigation involving gun possession crimes and concludes by evaluating the 
potential for Commerce Clause-based federalism to reemerge as a theme in 
the Roberts Court for cabining federal criminal law-making power. 
II.  GUNS, CRIME, AND FEDERAL POWER 
Often overlooked in the post-Heller focus on gun rights is an 
evaluation of the extent to which some federal gun laws could exceed 
congressional powers enumerated in Article I of the United States 
Constitution.  The constitutional case, based chiefly on the Commerce 
Clause, against federal gun restrictions is a plausible one, though—again, 
like Heller—it is not one that has found much favor in the lower federal 
courts.  Federal judges, however, have not been uniform in their 
understanding of Commerce Clause limits, and some have intimated 
strongly that the Supreme Court should address the confusion.  Perhaps the 
Supreme Court could show renewed interest in limiting the scope not just 
of federal gun legislation, but also federal criminal law, through a 
revitalized enforcement of the structural Constitution in federal gun 
possession cases.  The Court has had opportunities to do so and has thus 
far declined.  But there are signs that, if the appropriate opportunity 
presents itself, the Roberts Court may be poised to pick up where the 
Rehnquist Court’s judicially-enforced federalism left off.  And firearms-
related litigation will likely continue to present such an opportunity for the 
Court.  
A.  Guns and the Commerce Clause:  In the Supreme Court 
To assess the strength of a structural challenge to federal gun 
legislation, it is necessary to distinguish among those federal laws.  The 
comprehensive regulatory scheme set forth in the National Firearms Act, 
which requires registration of certain firearms and imposition of a modest 
tax, is based not on the commerce power but rather on Congress’s taxing 
power.50  The gun legislation codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924—i.e., the 
                                                                                                                          
50 26 U.S.C. § 5801 (2012); see also Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 511, 514 (1937) 
(indicating that the court upheld the National Firearms Act’s taxing mechanism as a valid exercise of 
taxing power). 
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punishment enhancements and mandatory minimum provisions, including 
the Armed Career Criminal Act51—is based on the existence of a predicate 
crime, either a drug trafficking crime or a federal crime of violence.52  So 
long as the statute establishing predicate crime is constitutional, Congress 
can impose the enhanced punishment where a firearm is used, carried, or 
possessed in connection with the predicate crime without implicating the 
Commerce Clause.  This is because the punishment is considered 
necessary and proper for executing the underlying power to define the 
predicate crime—usually, though not always, based on the commerce 
power.  Consequently, the most plausible structural challenges will be 
those based on categories of prohibited firearms possession, codified in 18 
U.S.C. § 922.  These statutes form only a small part of federal gun 
regulation, but often a substantial part of a federal prosecutor’s work.  
Moreover, those categories in § 922 should be further understood as 
distinguishing between gun possession crimes that require proof of a 
jurisdictional element and those that do not—a distinction that, for 
Commerce Clause purposes, may well matter.  So when discussing a viable 
Commerce Clause challenge to existing federal gun law, the focus should 
remain on § 922, which is the focus of the most seriously contested 
litigation in this area.  
A serious structural challenge to federal gun possession laws could be, 
and repeatedly has been, based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Lopez.53  The Lopez holding is thoroughly discussed in the 
relevant commentary and literature, so a brief summary will suffice here.  
Alfonso Lopez brought a loaded .38 caliber revolver to Edison High 
School in San Antonio, Texas.54  Lopez was to be paid forty dollars to give 
the gun to someone, in anticipation of a gang war.55  He was eventually 
prosecuted under the federal Gun Free School Zones Act and, upon his 
conviction, sentenced to six months.56  In validating Lopez’s challenge to 
the constitutionality of the statute, and rejecting the Government’s 
arguments as to why possession of a gun in a school zone affected 
interstate commerce, the Court attempted to synthesize its muddled 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  The Court identified three broad and 
                                                                                                                          
51 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).  
52 Id. § 924(c); see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41412, FEDERAL 
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING: THE 18 U.S.C. 924(C) TACK-ON IN CASES INVOLVING DRUGS 
OR VIOLENCE 1 (2013) (indicating that “[m]andatory minimums are found in the Armed Career 
Criminal Act, which “deals exclusively with recidivists,” and “Section 924(c), [which] attaches one of 
several mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment whenever a firearm is used or possessed during 
and in relation to a federal crime of violence and drug trafficking”).  
53 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
54 Id. at 551. 
55 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 514 U.S. 549. 
56 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551–52. 
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now-familiar categories of things that could properly be regulated under 
the Commerce Clause: (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) 
instrumentalities of, or persons or things in, interstate commerce; and (3) 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.57  Lopez’s case fell 
into the third category,58 and the Court found that possessing a gun in a 
school zone did not involve a substantial enough connection to interstate 
commerce to justify federal legislation; that possessing a gun in a school 
zone was not itself economic or commercial activity; and that the statute 
was an “essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which 
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated.”59  Notably, the legislation lacked a jurisdictional element that 
would have limited prosecutions to those cases with an effect on interstate 
commerce.60  Further, Congress did not adopt findings regarding the effect 
of gun possession in a school zone on interstate commerce.61  And any 
connection to interstate commerce arising from the prohibited conduct was 
too tenuous to establish a substantial effect.62  The Court noted that the 
definition and enforcement of the criminal law is a function in which the 
states are traditionally sovereign, which only served to strengthen the 
Court’s position that Congress had exceeded it power.63 
Lopez was a remarkable case in 1995 and one of the most significant 
components of the Rehnquist Court’s judicially-enforced federalism.  
Another major component was United States v. Morrison,64 which did not 
involve a gun statute, but rather the civil damages provisions of the 
Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”).65  In striking down that statute, 
the Court attempted to further explain its holding in Lopez and its new 
Commerce Clause doctrine.66  Much like the Gun Free School Zones Act, 
VAWA did not contain a jurisdictional element, and attempted to regulate 
non-commercial intrastate criminal conduct—violence against women.67  
Although Congress this time adopted extensive findings related to the 
effect of domestic violence upon interstate commerce, the Court again 
concluded that the connection was too attenuated.68  The Government tried 
                                                                                                                          
57 Id. at 558–59. 
58 Id. at 559. 
59 Id.  
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 563. 
62 See id. at 567–68 (indicating that “[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions . . .  [the Court] 
would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States”). 
63 Id. at 561 n.3, 564. 
64 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  
65 Id. at 601–02. 
66 Id. at 607–09.  
67 Id. at 613. 
68 Id. at 614–17. 
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to argue that the aggregate impact of domestic violence would ultimately 
create a substantial effect on interstate commerce, but the Court rejected 
the argument “that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal 
conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate 
commerce.”69  Repeating again its long-held view that there is no general 
federal police power, and that the Commerce Clause ought not to be read 
to create one, the Court stated that “[t]he regulation and punishment of 
intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or 
goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the 
States.”70  The Court concluded, “we can think of no better example of the 
police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and 
reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication 
of its victims.”71   
On its face, the Lopez/Morrison framework appeared to have real 
consequences for an ever-growing body of federal criminal law, which 
includes substantial gun control legislation.  Yet those cases did not 
explicitly account for two earlier decisions from the 1970s involving 
federal firearms possession crimes.  In the 1977 case Scarborough v. 
United States,72 the Court held that the federal felon-in-possession statute 
was satisfied merely by the firearm’s transportation, at some point in time, 
across state lines.73  The defendant in Scarborough was convicted of a drug 
crime.74  A year later, law enforcement officials recovered four firearms 
while searching the defendant’s home pursuant to a search warrant.75  The 
defendant unsuccessfully argued that the government could not establish 
an adequate nexus between the gun possession and interstate commerce 
merely by showing that, at some point in the past, the firearm had crossed 
state lines.76   
Scarborough followed United States v. Bass,77 a 1971 case involving 
the prosecution of a similar crime under an earlier statute.78  In Bass, the 
Court held that, in order to preserve the proper balance between federal 
and state power, there had to be at least some nexus between the 
possession and the travel in interstate commerce—but did not state 
precisely what would constitute such a nexus.79  Scarborough then held 
                                                                                                                          
69 Id. at 617. 
70 Id. at 618. 
71 Id. 
72 431 U.S. 563 (1977).  
73 Id. at 577.  The statute at issue in Scarborough was a predecessor to the current version of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
74 Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 564. 
75 Id. at 564–65. 
76 Id. at 566. 
77 404 U.S. 336 (1971).  
78 Id. at 337. 
79 Id. at 347. 
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that the firearm’s transportation in interstate commerce, at any point in 
time, was sufficient.80  “Congress,” the Court reasoned, “sought to reach 
possessions broadly, with little concern for when the nexus to commerce 
occurred. . . . [T]here is no question that Congress intended no more than a 
minimal nexus requirement.”81 
But neither Scarborough nor Bass appears to have been based on the 
scope of the Commerce Clause.82  And those cases pre-dated Lopez, which 
explicitly cited Bass for the proposition that the Court has interpreted the 
felon-in-possession statute to “reserve the constitutional question whether 
Congress could regulate, without more, the ‘mere possession’ of 
firearms.”83  This statement from Lopez seems to make clear that neither 
Bass nor Scarborough represents an enforceable precedent as to the 
constitutional validity of these possession bans.   
Another case from the 1970s, though, Perez v. United States,84 did 
address the commerce power and its relationship to the definition of 
federal crimes, setting forth the three categories of Commerce Clause 
regulation that the Court described in Lopez.85  Perez, which was decided 
the same year as Bass, involved the application of the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act of 1964, which punished the extortionate extension of credit 
(i.e., loan-sharking).86  But the law in dispute did not explicitly require a 
connection to commerce.87  The Court upheld the law, reasoning that these 
credit transactions were generally within the reach of congressional 
power.88  The Court explained that, even if the individual loan-sharking 
events did not affect commerce, courts could not “excise, as trivial, 
individual instances” of the class of regulated activity.89  Rather, Congress 
could rationally determine that the class of activity—here, loan-sharking—
affects interstate commerce.90  So even if the activity prosecuted in one 
case did not affect commerce, the class of activity was within the scope of 
                                                                                                                          
80 431 U.S. at 575. 
81 Id. at 577. 
82 The Court, however, clearly expressed concerns about the federal-state balance in Bass and 
dropped a footnote in Scarborough stating that “Congress was not particularly concerned with the 
impact on commerce except as a means to insure the constitutionality of [the statute].”  Id. at 575 n.11. 
83 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at 339 n.4). 
84 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
85 Id. at 150.   
86 Id. at 146–47.   
87 18 U.S.C. § 891 (2012). 
88 Perez, 402 U.S. at 153–54. 
89 Id. at 154 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
90 Id. at 155–56. 
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congressional power.91  A court, therefore, could not target this particular 
instance of the class as having an insufficient connection to commerce.92 
So how can we account for these pre-Lopez cases concerning the scope 
of federal power to define criminal law?  First, let us deal with Perez.  Not 
only did the Court cite Perez approvingly in Lopez,93 it also relied heavily 
upon Perez in Raich, its most recent pronouncement on the enforcement of 
federal criminal law pursuant to the Commerce Clause.94  There, the Court 
upheld the federal effort to enforce the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) 
against persons who used home-grown marijuana that had never traveled in 
interstate commerce for medicinal purposes.95  The consumption was legal 
in California under the state’s compassionate use law,96 but the federal 
government stepped in to enforce the CSA.  Justice Stevens’s majority 
opinion relied on Perez’s “class of activities” test97 and determined that 
because the CSA regulates the interstate economic marketplace for 
controlled substances like marijuana, a class of activity that was within 
congressional power, Congress had the power to reach wholly intrastate 
cultivation and possession of marijuana as part of the CSA’s larger 
economic regulation.98  The Court reasoned that it need not conclude 
whether, in the aggregate, the medicinal use of homegrown marijuana 
actually affected interstate commerce.99  All it needed to decide was 
whether Congress could rationally draw that conclusion—which the Court 
found it could have.100  This conclusion was based on the notion that 
Congress could eliminate the entire interstate market for marijuana through 
the CSA, and thus could also eliminate all use, possession, and growth of 
marijuana, no matter how local or noneconomic the activity.101   
Justice Scalia offered an important concurrence.  In his view, the 
“substantial effects” category of Commerce Clause regulation that the 
Court described was not justified by the Commerce Clause alone.102  
Rather, it required the assistance of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
because, unlike Category One (channels) and Category Two 
                                                                                                                          
91 Id. at 156–57.  
92 Id. 
93 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).  
94 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 3 (2005). 
95 Id. at 7–8, 32–33.  
96 Id. at 5–6. 
97 Id. at 17. 
98 See id. at 17–21 (reiterating the proposition from Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 
(1942), that Congress may regulate intrastate activities that have a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce, and also stating that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that locally 
grown marijuana intended for local consumption could still have an effect on the interstate market).   
99 Id. at 22. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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(instrumentalities, persons or things in) items, activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce are not themselves a part of it.103  Rather, their 
regulation is necessary and proper to carry the Commerce Clause into 
execution.104  Justice Scalia therefore relied almost exclusively upon the 
notion that the criminalization of wholly intrastate cultivation and 
possession of marijuana was necessary to enforce the more comprehensive 
regulatory scheme that the CSA established.105  In summary, whereas 
Justice Stevens concluded that the regulation was an essential part of a 
larger scheme of regulating a class of activity that was itself within the 
commerce power, Justice Scalia concluded that the regulation of an 
essential part of a more comprehensive regulatory scheme was justified by 
the Necessary and Proper Clause as a way of executing that scheme. 
There is much to the notion that Raich stopped whatever momentum 
remained of the Rehnquist Court’s judicially-enforced federalism and that 
it meant few, if any, limits could be imposed upon federal criminal laws.106  
Lopez and Morrison seemed relegated to some judicial receptacle, as 
quaint tokens of a distant past that now were worthy of being discarded.  
But Lopez and Morrison were not overruled.  The cultivation of marijuana 
was economic activity and thus subject to the aggregation theory.107  Recall 
that Lopez and Morrison did not decide whether that theory would apply to 
non-economic activity.108  Also, Raich did not conceive of the notion that 
intrastate activity could be subject to regulation if it was part of a national 
regulatory scheme that would be undermined if Congress could not reach 
the activity—Lopez did.109  A significant point of comparison is that, in 
Lopez, punishing possession of a gun in a school zone was apparently not 
                                                                                                                          
103 Id. at 33–34.  
104 See id. at 35 (“Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, 
Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”).  
105 Id. at 37. 
106 See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant, The Third Death of Federalism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 101, 102–05 (2007) (analyzing the history of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence and arguing that Raich represents the “third death of federalism”); Glenn H. Reynolds & 
Brannon P. Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915, 916–18 
(2005) (examining the impact of Raich on the Rehnquist Court’s attempt to establish judicially-
enforced federalism); Somin, supra note 44, at 508 (asserting that Raich represents a setback in 
imposing judicial constraints on congressional Commerce Clause power).  
107 Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.  
108 See United States v. Morrison 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (“We accordingly reject the argument 
that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s 
aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (“The 
possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through 
repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.”). 
109 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (stating that the statute at issue was not “an essential part of a 
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the 
intrastate activity were regulated”). 
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part of a larger scheme of commercial regulation.110  Raich also relied on 
the notion that Congress could eliminate the interstate market for 
marijuana, yet the same cannot be said for firearms.111  Unlike possession 
of marijuana, which has no constitutional protection in the Bill of Rights 
and thus could be made unlawful everywhere, some firearms possession is 
constitutionally protected.112  The problem, though, persisted: for purposes 
of federal criminal law, what is left of Lopez and Morrison after Raich? 
In 2011, the Court rejected an opportunity to add some clarity to this 
area of law and to better explain what remains of Lopez, Morrison, and 
Scarborough—particularly in a post-Raich world.  The Court has rejected 
many such opportunities,113 but the denial of certiorari in Alderman v. 
United States drew a particularly strong published dissent.114  In the 
underlying case, the government prosecuted Cedrick Alderman after 
Seattle police found him wearing a bulletproof vest.115  Alderman had a 
prior conviction for a robbery.116  Moreover, the vest had been 
manufactured in California and its manufacturer sold it to a Washington 
distributor.117  Consequently, Alderman’s possession of the vest satisfied 
the elements of the James Guelff and Chris McCurley Body Armor Act of 
2002, codified in the firearms regulation provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 931.118  
The statute makes it a federal crime for a violent felon to possess body 
armor,119 which is defined as “any product sold or offered for sale, in 
interstate or foreign commerce, as personal protective body covering 
intended to protect against gunfire.”120 
The Ninth Circuit upheld Alderman’s conviction against a Commerce 
Clause challenge, citing Scarborough.121  In the Ninth Circuit’s view, 
Scarborough represented yet another category of permissible Commerce 
Clause legislation—cases in which Congress had regulated something that 
                                                                                                                          
110 Id.  
111 Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. 
112 U.S. CONST. amend. II; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) 
(holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms in the home for 
self-defense purposes).   
113 E.g., Patton v. United States, 549 U.S. 1213 (2007).  In United States v. Patton, the Tenth 
Circuit upheld a federal statute that criminalized body armor possession.  451 F.3d 615, 636 (10th Cir. 
2006).  The court wrote that it saw tension between Scarborough and the more recent Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, and expressed its hope that the “Supreme Court will revisit this issue in an 
appropriate case—maybe even this one.”  Id. 
114 Alderman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 700, 700 (2011). 
115 United States v. Alderman, 565 F.3d 641, 643 (9th Cir. 2009). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 644.  
118 Id. at 643. 
119 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 931(a) (2006)). 
120 Id. at 656 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(35)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121 Id. at 647–48. 
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had at one point in time traveled in interstate commerce.122  Judge Paez 
dissented from the panel opinion,123 and Judge O’Scannlain dissented from 
the court’s denial of rehearing en banc.124  Alderman sought certiorari, 
which the Supreme Court denied.125 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the Court’s 
rejection of Alderman’s petition—writing to lament what he viewed as the 
death of both Lopez and any meaningful limits on Commerce Clause 
power.126  Justice Thomas began by asserting that the Court “tacitly 
accept[ed] the nullification of our recent Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.”127  He repeatedly explained his view that Scarborough was 
merely a statutory interpretation case and did not purport to determine the 
scope of Congress’s commerce power.128  He further observed that 
although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Lopez and Morrison 
changed the Commerce Clause landscape, that court still felt bound by 
Scarborough.129  Justice Thomas emphasized that other courts appeared 
similarly confused about whether Scarborough set forth a rule to follow in 
Commerce Clause challenges—given Lopez and Morrison—yet felt they 
had to follow the decision in the absence of further guidance.130  For that 
reason, and in light of what he viewed as an irreconcilable conflict between 
the Lopez/Morrison framework and an interpretation of Scarborough as a 
Commerce Clause case, Justice Thomas remarked that it was “difficult to 
imagine a better case for certiorari.”131  He concluded his dissent by 
reiterating themes about limits on federal power that animated his separate 
opinions in Lopez and Raich.  Allowing the federal government to 
criminalize the wholly intrastate possession of body armor, where the only 
connection to interstate commerce was the sale of the vests three years 
prior from the manufacturer to the distributor, Justice Thomas reasoned, 
“would trespass on traditional state police powers.”132  He finished, “[i]f 
the Lopez framework is to have any ongoing vitality, it is up to this Court 
                                                                                                                          
122 Id. at 645–46.  
123 Id. at 648 (Paez, J., dissenting).  Judge Paez expressed skepticism about the treatment of 
Scarborough in this case and in other circuits, and concluded that although the commerce power is 
broad, it is also limited.  Id. at 656–58. 
124 Alderman v. United States, 593 F.3d 1141, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010) (O’Scannlain, J, dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc). 
125 Alderman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 700, 700 (2011).  
126 Id. at 703 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari). 
127 Id.  




132 Id. at 703.  
 2014] THE INELUDIBLE (CONSTITUTIONAL) POLITICS OF GUNS 1365 
to prevent it from being undermined by a 1977 precedent that does not 
squarely address the constitutional issue.”133 
Does the Court’s denial of review in Alderman suggest that many of 
the Justices are satisfied with existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence on 
these possession crimes?  Does it demonstrate that Scarborough remains 
good law regarding the scope of the Commerce Clause?  It is, of course, 
hard to know for certain.  But a survey of a few lower court decisions 
indicates two things: first, many federal judges could use greater clarity 
from the Court; and second, in the absence of additional Supreme Court 
directions, federal courts are disinclined to strike down federal gun 
possession restrictions or to use gun restrictions in the effort to constrain 
federal criminal law. 
B.  Guns and the Commerce Clause: Federal Litigation After Lopez 
Despite the pleas of Justices Thomas and Scalia, and of a few federal 
judges, lower courts have been generally reluctant to read Lopez as 
requiring judicial invalidation of § 922 offenses.  Where the constitutional 
challenge involved a firearm that was transported across state lines at some 
point since its manufacture, lower courts have often relied upon the Court’s 
indeterminate Scarborough decision.  Where the constitutional challenge 
involves a firearm that has never traveled interstate, but has remained 
entirely within one state, lower courts have relied upon Raich.134  Lopez 
itself, then, has proven mostly ineffective as a precedential weapon for 
limiting the scope and application of federal gun restrictions—and of 
federal criminal law generally.  A survey of a few of the numerous cases 
will suffice to demonstrate the point.   
The felon-in-possession statute, § 922(g), has been subjected to 
frequent constitutional challenges after Lopez and consistently upheld 
either through explicit reference to Scarborough135 or else by applying 
Scarborough’s rationale to the statute’s jurisdictional hook.136  
                                                                                                                          
133 Id.; cf. Conor P. McEvily, Note, Vested Interests: The Federal Felon Body-Armor Ban and the 
Continuing Vitality of Scarborough v. United States, 100 GEO. L.J. 1341, 1343–44 (2012) (arguing that 
the body armor ban should be considered part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme and governed by 
Raich). 
134 See, e.g., United States v. Stewart (Stewart II), 451 F.3d 1070, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(reasoning that Raich allows the government to regulate an object so long as there is a rational basis 
that the object could affect the interstate market).  
135 E.g., United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213, 216–17 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Bates, 
77 F.3d 1101, 1104 (8th Cir. 1996). 
136 E.g., United States v. Hill, 386 F.3d 855, 859 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Mitchell, 299 
F.3d 632, 634–35 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1272–74 (11th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Baer, 235 F.3d 561, 563 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 723 
(4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Turner, 77 F.3d 887, 888–89 (6th Cir. 1996).  For criticism of the 
reasoning applied in these cases, see Strang, supra note 48, at 408–09. 
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For example, United States v. Singletary137 squarely raised the question 
of Scarborough’s viability after Lopez and Morrison.  In December 1999, 
Philadelphia Police saw Singletary, a convicted felon, drive across a 
sidewalk into a park, exit his truck, fire two shots into the air, and then 
drive away.138  During a chase, Singletary threw his .38 caliber revolver 
out of the passenger side window.139  According to the evidence at trial, the 
gun was made in Brazil and imported through Georgia, eventually making 
its way to a firearms seller in Texas in 1973.140  There was no evidence as 
to when the gun came into Pennsylvania.141  Singletary asked for a jury 
instruction that would have required the jury to find that the gun possession 
substantially affected interstate commerce.142  The district court denied the 
request and instructed the jury that it need only find that the gun, at some 
point, traveled in interstate commerce.143   
Rather than carve out a new category of constitutional dimension for 
Scarborough, the Third Circuit viewed Scarborough as a statutory 
interpretation decision whose rationale—that the gun at some point 
traveled in interstate commerce—survived Lopez and Morrison.144  Neither 
of those cases explicitly rejected Scarborough, the court said, and thus they 
left intact the understanding that any previous travel in interstate commerce 
was sufficient to keep the statute within the bounds of the Commerce 
Clause.145  The court further distinguished Lopez and Morrison by holding 
that those cases were about regulating activities affecting commerce, 
whereas § 922(g)(1), through its jurisdictional element, “regulates the 
possession of goods moved in interstate commerce. . . . It addresses items 
sent in interstate commerce and the channels of commerce themselves, 
delineating that the latter be kept clear of firearms.  Thus, an analysis of the 
kind utilized in Lopez or Morrison [was] neither appropriate nor 
needed.”146   
The Singletary court’s explanation, like that of the many other courts 
that have employed similar explanations, is subject to some question.  
First, the court failed to address the question of whether mere movement in 
interstate commerce at some historical moment is sufficient to satisfy 
Lopez and Morrison, though it may satisfy Scarborough.  After all, if the 
Commerce Clause could be satisfied by mere shipment or transportation of 
                                                                                                                          
137 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001). 
138 Id. at 197. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 198. 
141 Id.  
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 200. 
145 Id. at 202–03. 
146 Id. at 204.   
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a gun between states, then the Lopez Court should have inquired into the 
origin of the gun that Lopez brought to the high school, and then upheld 
the Gun Free School Zones Act if it was made or sold outside of Texas.  
However,  the Lopez Court did not make such an inquiry, which suggests 
that mere travel across state lines at some point is not enough to satisfy the 
Constitution, even if it satisfies § 922.  The Singletary court also assumed 
that it was a Lopez Category One case (a channels case), or perhaps even a 
Category Two case (“persons or things in interstate commerce”), but 
emphatically not a Category Three case (a substantial effects case).147  But 
when Congress regulates the mere possession of something that has 
traveled across state lines already, and often at some distant moment in the 
past, it is questionable whether Congress is really regulating the channels 
of, or the persons or things in, interstate commerce.  As Dean Strang notes, 
“[t]he Commerce Clause does not take Congress back to the future.”148  
Section 922(g)(1) targets persons—felons, whether state or federal—who 
may not be in interstate commerce, and items that they possess, which 
often are not actually in interstate commerce any longer.149  And the 
regulated activity of mere possession is not itself commercial, nor is it 
necessary that the regulated person have actually obtained the firearm 
commercially, as § 922(g)(1) forbids felon possession regardless of how 
the firearm was obtained.150  It is hard to read Lopez, or any of the channels 
or “persons or things in” cases, as reaching this far.  Indeed, when the 
Tenth Circuit interpreted the body armor statute—which contains a similar 
jurisdictional element—in United States v. Patton,151 it rejected the notion 
that regulation of mere possession, as opposed to regulating the movement 
or transportation of the item itself, fits into Category One.152  Nor does 
such regulation fit within Category Two: body armor is not itself an 
instrument of commerce; the statute does not regulate the use of body 
armor in ways that threaten instruments of commerce; and the body armor 
need not actually be in interstate commerce.153  These very same arguments 
could be made as to the possession statutes under § 922(g).  Therefore, 
only the substantial effects analysis could save the statute, and that analysis 
is governed by Lopez and Morrison, which Singletary refused to apply for 
purposes of § 922(g)(1).154  On that matter, the Patton court, in an opinion 
from Judge McConnell, found no rational basis for concluding that 
                                                                                                                          
147 Id.; see also United States v. Lopez, 515 U.S. 549, 558–59 (discussing three channels of 
commerce that Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause).  
148 Strang, supra note 48, at 408. 
149 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). 
150 Id. 
151 451 F.3d 615 (10th Cir. 2006). 
152 Id. at 621. 
153 Id. at 622. 
154 United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 1368 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1345 
possession of body armor substantially affects interstate commerce, and 
instead—reluctantly, with an implicit plea to the Supreme Court for 
clarity—relied upon Scarborough, finding no meaningful difference 
between the body armor and felon-in-possession statutes.155  
United States v. Stewart (Stewart II)156 represents an important post-
Raich decision as to federal gun statutes that do not contain a jurisdictional 
element.  In Stewart I, the Ninth Circuit considered the constitutionality of 
§ 922(o), which makes it a federal crime to possess a machine gun but does 
not explicitly require that the machine gun, or its possession, be linked to 
interstate commerce.157  Prior to Raich, the Ninth Circuit held that § 922(o) 
violated the Commerce Clause.158  This was a notable holding, as most 
circuits by that point, including the Ninth Circuit, had repeatedly upheld 
§ 922(o).159   
In fact, to show the lengths that some lower courts will go to uphold 
federal gun statutes, consider that the Tenth Circuit found two distinct 
bases for upholding this law: (1) that § 922(o) regulates things in interstate 
commerce because a machine gun is “an item bound up with interstate 
attributes;”160 and (2) that the statute regulates activities that substantially 
affect commerce, in part because § 922(o) is an essential part of a larger 
regulatory scheme and in part because possessing a machine gun is 
economic activity, understood to include conduct that is “closely linked to 
commercial transactions.”161   
However, after Raich, Stewart II was remanded by the Supreme Court 
and the Ninth Circuit followed other circuits in holding that the statute 
satisfied the Commerce Clause—though on much narrower grounds than 
                                                                                                                          
155 See Patton, 451 F.3d at 635–36 (“Like our sister circuits, we see considerable tension between 
Scarborough and the three-category approach adopted by the Supreme Court in its recent Commerce 
Clause cases, and like our sister circuits, we conclude we are bound by Scarborough, which was left 
intact by Lopez.”). 
156 451 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2006). 
157 United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated by United States v. 
Stewart (Stewart I), 545 U.S. 1112 (2005). 
158 Id. at 1142. 
159 E.g., United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161, 1171 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Franklyn, 
157 F.3d 90, 93–96 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27, 31 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 285 
(3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 1996). 
160 United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1995).  The Tenth Circuit cited this 
precedent approvingly in Haney, even though the defendant in that case actually walked into a police 
station and confessed to possessing automatic and semiautomatic firearms that were unlicensed before 
claiming that he could not constitutionally be required to obtain a license for them.  Id. at 1163.  He 
was indicted for possession only, and the court saw no need to analyze whether Category Two required 
that the statute apply only to firearms actually in interstate commerce, as opposed to firearms that were 
simply possessed wholly intrastate.  Id. at 1168.  
161 Haney, 264 F.3d at 1170. 
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the Tenth Circuit.162  Judge Kozinski’s opinion in Stewart II suggested that 
there are differences between the CSA and § 922(o)—for example, the 
machine gun ban was enacted two decades after Congress enacted the 
regulatory scheme related to firearms163—but nonetheless concluded that 
Raich permits Congress to “ban possession of an object where it has a 
rational basis for concluding that object might bleed into the interstate 
market and affect supply and demand, especially in an area where 
Congress regulates comprehensively.”164 
The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, which forbids juvenile 
possession of a handgun except under limited circumstances and contains 
no jurisdictional element or hook,165 has also been treated as part of a 
larger scheme of commercial regulation (after Lopez, but before Raich).  In 
United States v. Michael R.,166 for example, the Ninth Circuit explained 
that although mere possession of a handgun might not be economic 
activity, the juvenile possession ban of § 922(x)(2) is part of a statutory 
scheme that begins with a prohibition on the sale, delivery, or transfer a 
handgun to a juvenile, as set forth in § 922(x)(1).167  Therefore, “[r]ead as a 
whole,” the court said, “922(x) by its terms regulates commerce . . . 
Congress is in effect regulating interstate commerce by attacking both the 
supply and demand for firearms with respect to juveniles.”168  The court 
also went further, holding that juvenile handgun possession has a 
substantial effect on commerce.169  It makes sense, according to the court, 
to conclude that “regulating the sale, transfer, and possession of handguns 
by juveniles could have a substantial effect in curbing the illegal flow in 
commerce of drugs and firearms.”170  The Ninth Circuit gave almost 
complete deference to Congress’s conclusions about the close connection 
between drug use and violent crime, and cited other precedent accepting 
legislative findings about the effects of violence on interstate commerce.171   
This former portion of the court’s opinion is questionable in light of 
not only Lopez, which rejected an inference-upon-inference approach to 
establishing a nexus between the regulated activity and a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce,172 but also in light of Morrison (decided four years 
later), which reaffirmed the Lopez approach regarding proof of substantial 
                                                                                                                          
162 Stewart II, 451 F.3d 1071, 1073–78 (9th Cir. 2006).   
163 Id. at 1076–77. 
164 Id. 
165 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2) (2012). 
166 United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 344 (9th Cir. 1996).  
167 Id. at 343 n.1.  
168 Id. at 344. 
169 Id. at 344–45. 
170 Id. at 345. 
171 Id.  
172 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).  
 1370 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1345 
effects.173  It is therefore the “larger regulation” rationale which best 
supports the holding in Michael R., a holding now bolstered by Raich.174  
The First Circuit employed a similar rationale in upholding the same 
statute in United States v. Rene E.,175 in which a juvenile defendant was 
charged with possessing drug paraphernalia, stolen goods, hollow point 
ammunition for a .38 caliber handgun, and a revolver with a wooden 
grip.176  Relying on its pre-Raich holding in United States v. Cardoza177 
and concluding that Raich simply reinforced that decision,178 the First 
Circuit held that the juvenile possession statute was an essential part of a 
scheme “designed to ‘control the supply and demand’ of a commodity in 
the interstate market.”179  This rationale was enough to save the statute.   
But even this rationale is questionable.  If possession of a gun in a 
school zone was not an essential part of a more comprehensive regulatory 
scheme in Lopez, why would a court find that possession by a juvenile was 
an essential part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme?  It would be fair 
to argue that § 922(q)—the statute in question in Lopez—was not really a 
stand-alone provision.  Rather, it was also a part of a broader regulatory 
scheme that contained provisions related to the sale, delivery, or transfer of 
guns, only in a different section of the code.  Can it really be that the 
underlying question of whether the regulatory scheme is comprehensive 
depends upon whether the specific provisions for sale, delivery, or transfer 
appear in the same subsection of the code?  In other words, if § 922 
establishes a comprehensive regulatory scheme, then one might reasonably 
imagine that anything codified in § 922 is a part of that scheme.  So if the 
Ninth Circuit’s argument in Michael R. is sound, that same argument 
should have saved § 922(q) in Lopez.  But it did not.180  
One could also raise this same question with respect to Stewart II’s 
holding that the machine gun ban is part of a larger regulatory scheme.  
Judge Kozinski, though, had a response to this argument in light of Raich.  
He contended that in Lopez, the possession of a gun in school zone was 
“unlikely to affect the supply and demand for guns in the national market,” 
but that Congress could have rationally concluded that homemade machine 
guns would affect the national market.181  The basis for this conclusion, 
though, is unclear from the Stewart II opinion.  The better questions, then, 
might be these: what exactly constitutes a “comprehensive regulatory 
                                                                                                                          
173 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000).  
174 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005).  
175 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009). 
176 Id. at 9. 
177 129 F.3d 6, 13 (1st Cir. 1997). 
178 Rene E., 583 F.3d at 17–18. 
179 Id. at 18. 
180 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).  
181 Stewart II, 451 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006).   
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scheme,” and how do we know when something is part of it?  Neither 
Raich nor Stewart II seem to address these questions.182 
Nonetheless, Stewart II’s rationale persists.  Most recently, in Montana 
Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder183 the Ninth Circuit relied upon Stewart II 
to reject a Commerce Clause challenge to the Montana Firearms Freedom 
Act, a state law that would have prevented the enforcement of federal 
firearms regulations if the firearm at issue was manufactured, sold, or 
possessed entirely intrastate.184  In Montana Shooting Sports, the owner of 
a Montana business that manufactured gun range equipment wanted to 
manufacture a rifle (known as the “Montana Buckeroo”) and sell it entirely 
within the state, without being subjected to federal regulation.185  The 
Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiff failed to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted, reasoning that the Commerce 
Clause permits federal regulation of firearms and that federal regulation 
preempts the Montana law.186  Citing Stewart II, Judge Clifton’s opinion 
explained that Congress could rationally conclude that some unlicensed 
firearms could find their way into the interstate market, notwithstanding 
efforts by the plaintiff or others to keep them entirely within Montana.187  
Yet even Judge Clifton’s opinion seemed lukewarm about the reach of 
Raich and the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine after that decision.  
Judge Clifton acknowledged the argument there that the Supreme Court’s 
doctrine implicated considerations of state sovereignty, as well as the 
plaintiff’s acknowledgement that the Ninth Circuit’s “hands are tied” by 
Stewart II.188   
The “firearms freedom” legislation—which has been adopted or 
proposed in many states,189 and of which Montana’s law is a good 
example—could potentially form the basis for the next generation of gun 
litigation involving the Commerce Clause.190  The Supreme Court’s recent 
                                                                                                                          
182 For a discussion of this problem and an argument that the § 922(g) statutes are an essential part 
of such a scheme, see McEvily, supra note 133, at 1383–86.  But see Strang, supra note 48, at 409–10 
(arguing that the felon-in-possession statute is not like the CSA). 
183 727 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 955 (2014) and 134 S. Ct. 1335 (2014). 
184 Id. at 978, 982. 
185 Id. at 978. 
186 Id. at 981–83. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 981. 
189 As an indication of the momentum for such legislation, one website is devoted entirely to 
support for “Firearms Freedom” Acts.  The Firearms Freedom Act (FFA) Is Sweeping the Nation, 
FIREARMS FREEDOM ACT (June 3, 2010), http://firearmsfreedomact.com.  According to that website, 
nine states have passed “firearms freedom” legislation: Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming.  Id.  Such legislation is pending in twenty-seven other 
states.  Id. 
190 See Ilya Shapiro, Guns and the Commerce Clause: On the Way to the Supreme Court?, CATO 
AT LIBERTY (Mar. 18, 2013, 8:57 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/guns-commerce-clause-way-
supreme-court (arguing that federal law does not preempt Montana’s right to make its own laws 
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denial of certiorari in Montana Shooting Sports, like its recent denials of 
other high-profile gun issues,191 suggests that the Court is, for now, content 
to allow the fate of new gun-related legislation to be determined by others. 
Those laws often create Supremacy Clause and Tenth Amendment issues 
as well, which may complicate subsequent litigation.  But the Montana 
Shooting Sports decision is likely an indication of the fate that those state 
laws will meet, which is the same fate as Commerce Clause challenges to 
federal criminal legislation on guns: Raich, and the pre-Raich circuit law, 
will effectively shut the door to the challenge, at least until the Supreme 
Court is prepared to rethink, or cabin, Raich.  Indeed, what is especially 
noticeable is just how many lower courts were well in front of the Supreme 
Court in using the class of activities/comprehensive regulatory scheme 
rationale to uphold federal firearms possession laws prior to Raich.192  
Now, particularly in a post-Raich gun regulation world, it seems difficult 
to imagine a scenario in which lower courts would invalidate any of these 
gun possession statutes.  And that seems true even if we assume that 
Scarborough does not supply the appropriate analysis where the statute 
requires travel in interstate commerce.  For now, even if Lopez forbids 
reliance on Scarborough as a constitutional matter, and requires that the 
government show a substantial effect rather than mere sale, transfer, or 
travel across state lines at some historical moment,193 lower courts have 
read Raich so broadly that most any of the possession statutes will 
constitute an essential part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme.194  The 
presence of a jurisdictional element matters far less. 
Once again, however, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Patton supplies 
something of a counterweight: there Judge McConnell’s opinion said that 
the body armor legislation could not be justified under Raich because it 
was not part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme.195  That is, there was 
no provision of the statute that distinctly regulated commercial activity, in 
that it criminalized the sale of body armor to a felon or purchase from a 
                                                                                                                          
governing intrastate gun manufacture, sale, and possession).  Note, however, that the Supreme Court 
denied the petitions for a writ of certiorari in Montana Shooting Sports Association.  134 S. Ct. 955 
(2014) and 134 S. Ct. 1335 (2014). 
191 See, e.g., Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014) (denying review of lower court decision 
upholding New Jersey’s “justifiable need” standard for public carry of a firearm).  
192 See, e.g., United States v. Day, 476 F.2d 562, 566–67 (6th Cir. 1973) (“Just as Congress made 
findings that intrastate credit transactions were part of a class of activities amenable to federal 
regulation, the Act before this court reveals findings of the interrelationship between the business of 
selling guns and interstate crime and interstate trafficking in guns.”).  
193 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995).  
194 See Somin, supra note 44, at 525 (recognizing the “ease with which virtually any regulation 
can be fitted into a ‘comprehensive regulatory scheme’”). 
195 United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 627–28 (10th Cir. 2006).  But see Somin, supra note 44, 
at 525 (arguing that Patton’s reasoning is hardly a real limit because, after Raich, Congress could 
simply reenact the statute in a different scheme that is comprehensive, like the CSA).  
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felon.196  This is distinguishable from the firearm statutes in § 922, which 
contains provisions barring the sale or transfer of a firearm to a prohibited 
person.197  So perhaps this is one useful way to determine what constitutes 
a comprehensive regulatory scheme: evaluating whether the possession 
statute is a part of a collection of statutes on the same subject matter that 
also regulate sale or other commercial transfer of the item.   
Notably, though, the body armor statute does forbid convicted felons 
from purchasing body armor,198 which is defined as a “product” that is 
“sold or offered for sale in interstate or foreign commerce.”199  So if Judge 
McConnell is correct that this is not a scheme that regulates a commercial 
market in which body armor is a fungible commodity, then surely the same 
would be true for firearm possession crimes under § 922.  And yet if the 
other circuits that have applied Raich to uphold § 922 possession statutes 
are correct, then it seems that all Congress needs to do to justify a statute 
criminalizing the wholly intrastate possession of an item is to include such 
a statute in the same code section as a statute that also criminalizes the sale 
of the item.  One might justifiably wonder if this is simply too easy of a 
requirement, permitting Congress to perform an end-run around the 
Lopez/Morrison Commerce Clause limits and effectively producing the 
kind of general police power that the Court has so often feared. 
III.  GUNS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF  
COMMERCE CLAUSE-FEDERALISM 
In light of the overwhelming lower court cases that have rejected 
Commerce Clause challenges to federal gun restrictions, it is fair to ask: 
what is the point of even raising such a challenge today?  Failure looms.  
Rejection is inevitable.  And it is conventional wisdom that the Rehnquist 
Court’s judicially-enforced federalism revolution fizzled in the early 
2000s, particularly after Raich appeared to eliminate whatever wind was 
left in the Court’s federalism sails.200  This conventional wisdom might 
well seem to be reinforced by a Roberts Court that kept federal criminal 
authority constitutionally broad in United States v. Kebodeaux201 and 
Comstock v. United States,202 each of which upheld federal criminal laws 
                                                                                                                          
196 Patton, 451 F.3d at 627–28. 
197 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d), 922(x)(1) (2012). 
198 Id. § 931(a). 
199 Id. § 921(a)(35). 
200 See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 106, at 933 (noting “the possibility that Raich announces 
a return to the days in which the Bill of Rights is the only judicially-enforced limit on the power of the 
federal government”); see also Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of 
Lopez, or What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 
WISC. L. REV. 369, 371 (discussing lower court approaches to Lopez). 
201 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013). 
202 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
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pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause.203  Even Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito did not join Justice Thomas’s dissent in 
Alderman.204  And the Court has simply refused to grant any of the many 
certiorari petitions filed in gun possession cases asserting Commerce 
Clause challenges.205  
Perhaps, then, there is much to commend the argument that federal 
criminal law—and commerce power in particular—will remain sufficiently 
broad in the Roberts Court to maintain a robust scheme of federal firearms 
regulation.  But not so fast.  Not unlike the Rehnquist Court, the Roberts 
Court has proven somewhat uneven on federal power and state 
sovereignty—yet there are signs that limits on federal power are still on the 
Roberts Court’s mind. 
Strange as it may seem in the context of a discussion of federal 
criminal law, the litigation over federal health care reform offers a 
cautionary note.  Consider, for example, that the political Right had 
substantial success in employing the federal courts to attack the legality of 
the Affordable Care Act (popularly known as “Obamacare”).206  Although 
the Supreme Court ultimately found constitutional authority for the ACA 
in Congress’s taxing power, five members of the Court rejected the Act’s 
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause—which was the political 
Right’s chief constitutional basis for attacking on the legislation.207  This 
theory was heavily criticized, even openly mocked, when first advanced.208  
And yet, after the Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent 
Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius,209  we now have constitutional law embracing 
the theory of the Commerce Clause that the individual mandate’s 
challengers advanced.210  Chief Justice Roberts explained that “[t]he 
Commerce Clause is not a general license to regulate an individual from 
cradle to grave, simply because he will predictably engage in particular 
transactions.  Any police power to regulate individuals as such, as opposed 
                                                                                                                          
203 Id. at 1965; Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2502–04. 
204 Alderman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 700 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari).  
205 See 60 Cases and Counting: What Gun Case Will SCOTUS Take Next?, DAILY KOS (Oct. 28, 
2013), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/10/28/1250584/-60-Cases-and-Counting-What-Gun-Case-
Will-SCOTUS-Take-Next (stating that the Supreme Court has turned down requests to review over 
sixty gun rights cases).  
206 See JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO OBAMACARE 
79–81 (2013) (discussing the beginning of the battle against the Affordable Care Act).  
207 Id. at 259–61. 
208 Former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi famously asked (twice), “Are you serious?,” when a 
reporter questioned her about the constitutionality of the ACA.  Editorial, “Are You Serious?,” LAS 
VEGAS REV.-J. (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.reviewjournal.com/opinion/are-you-serious. 
209 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012). 
210 Id. at 2589. 
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to their activities, remains vested in the States.”211  The joint dissent of 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito rejected the Government’s 
commerce-based theory, citing the Court’s federalism cases from the past 
decade and concluding that “[t]he lesson of these cases is that the 
Commerce Clause, even when supplemented by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, is not carte blanche for doing whatever will help achieve the ends 
Congress seeks by the regulation of commerce.”212  In the context of gun 
crime—perhaps no less than in the context of the political debate over the 
need for health insurance reform—the joint dissent’s words have force: 
“Article I contains no whatever-it-takes-to-solve-a-national-problem 
power.”213   
Consequently, one should take care not to so easily gloss over the 
Chief Justice’s opinion, when combined with that of the four dissenters, in 
NFIB.  Those portions of the opinion might not tell us much in the way of 
discerning the continued vitality of Lopez and Morrison after Raich, but 
they demonstrate at a minimum that the Roberts Court (most importantly 
the Chief Justice and Justice Alito) are mindful of limits on federal power.  
While it is true that the ACA’s individual mandate represented an unusual 
congressional approach to using the commerce power—forcing individuals 
into a marketplace, where their inaction would have kept them out of it—
that appears to be sui generis, the fact that the Court was willing to impose 
yet another limit on the commerce power remains significant.   
Add to this the Court’s holding that the Medicaid expansion provisions 
of ACA could not be sustained pursuant to the Spending Clause,214 as well 
as its recent decision in Shelby County v. Holder,215 in which the Court 
found unconstitutional the provision of the Voting Rights Act that had 
determined the formula for requiring preclearance under Section Five of 
the Act.216  In Shelby County, another opinion from the Chief Justice, the 
Court endorsed the notion of “equal sovereignty,” rigorously scrutinizing 
the federal government’s efforts to treat different states differently.217  Add 
also the Roberts Court’s decisions applying the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) in federal habeas cases brought 
by state prisoners, which the Court strictly interpreted in ways that protect 
state interests in criminal law enforcement and that offer wide deference to 
                                                                                                                          
211 Id. at 2631. 
212 Id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
213 Id. at 2650.  
214 Id. at 2606–07 (majority opinion).  
215 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
216 Id. at 2631.  
217 Id. at 2622. 
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the decisions of state courts, as the statute requires.218  And then there 
remains the view that Justices Scalia and Thomas articulated in their 
Alderman dissent from the denial of certiorari219—although, again, perhaps 
it is telling of something that neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Alito 
joined that dissent or the desire to grant certiorari there. 
Federalism, it turns out, may be alive after all on the Roberts Court.  
That could be welcome news to the growing chorus, comprised of 
commentators across the political spectrum, that has lamented the scope of 
the existing federal criminal law regime.220  In light of these movements 
potentially coalescing, it is not so far-fetched to imagine a challenge to a 
federal law, like a firearms regulation, that might catch the Court’s 
attention as a vehicle for reviving Lopez—or some post-Raich version of 
it—as a real constraint on the federal criminal law. 
Still, those on the Right who have been so adamant about defending 
gun rights and opposing new gun control measures repeatedly say they 
want to protect the interests of “law abiding citizens” and “keep guns out 
of the wrong hands in the first place.”221  So one reason conservatives may 
shy away from embracing gun possession challenges on structural grounds 
is that to do so might be seen as aligning them with an unappealing 
constituency: those accused of serious crimes or acts of violence.  But of 
course that was true in Lopez and Morrison;222 it is true when conservatives 
embrace Second Amendment theories that might inure to the benefit of 
those accused of, or who have a history of, criminal violence; and it is true 
any time one argues for limits on governmental powers with respect to the 
definition or enforcement of criminal law.  It is the Supreme Court’s 
conservatives, after all, that have been most likely to take positions on 
limiting federal criminal law-making power,223 and it is those same 
                                                                                                                          
218 See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1410–11 (2011) (applying AEDPA in rejecting state 
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loaded, concealed handgun into school).  
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do not agree that what is necessary and proper to enforce a statute validly enacted pursuant to an 
enumerated power is not itself necessary and proper to the execution of an enumerated power.”); id. at 
2510 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the enactment of “SORNA does not ‘carry into Execution’ 
any of the federal powers enumerated in the Constitution”); United States v. Alderman, 131 S. Ct. 700 
(2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that in denying certiorari the Court 
“tacitly accept[ed] the nullification of our recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence” that placed limits on 
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positions that would inure to the benefit of criminal defendants in the 
relevant cases.   
Another reason to be skeptical about the intellectual consistency of the 
political Right on this issue is that while bemoaning the scope of federal 
power generally, and the commerce power specifically, many on the Right 
have continued to embrace legislation that keeps federal power expansive.  
For example, many on the Right recently supported legislation that would 
have made it a federal crime to perform an abortion after twenty weeks of 
pregnancy.224  The proposed statute, which passed the House but has 
received no action in the Senate, contained no jurisdictional hook.225  And 
its findings were mainly devoted to demonstrating why the Supreme 
Court’s abortion jurisprudence did not apply to invalidate the law.226  The 
legislation’s only reference to Article I power was a curt statement that the 
Supreme Court has given Congress broad powers pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause.227  Yet if conservatives and others on the political Right 
are to be intellectually honest and consistent about the scope of the 
commerce power, then those who have previously been critical of the 
expansion of commerce authority  should be quick to either reject this kind 
of  legislation or to state more clearly the constitutional basis for 
Congress’s power to adopt it.  Consider, on this point, that Justice Thomas 
intimated a concern in Gonzales v. Carhart228—which upheld the federal 
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 against a due process challenge—
that the legislation may have presented a Commerce Clause problem had 
that issue been before the Court.229  If overfederalization is a problem, 
surely it cannot be one that is limited only to those substantive policies 
with which one disagrees.  
                                                                                                                          
federal commerce power); United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1970 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not permit civil commitment of sex 
offenders released from federal custody because the law does not execute any enumerated power); see 
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229 Id. at 168–69 (Thomas, J., concurring).  For a unique perspective on this issue, see Brannon P. 
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Of course, again, much of this may depend upon the kind of 
conservatism that one embraces.  We thus return to the problem identified 
earlier about the relevant differences among modern conservatism.  But it 
is worth noting that a judicial review that enforces structural limits on 
federal power is not necessarily the same as one that uses judicial review to 
expand the reach of the Bill of Rights.  Federalism is a notion that fits 
comfortably in the more traditional brand of conservatism, and though 
judges of this mold may be reluctant to use judicial review to enforce 
federalism and the structural Constitution, doing so does not instantly 
consign the judge to the more libertarian camp.230  William Rehnquist and 
Sandra Day O’Connor, for example, fully embraced the Court’s program 
of judicially-enforced federalism, and neither is typically characterized as 
libertarian.231  Ernest Young offers an excellent explanation of why 
devotion to a healthy federalism is fully consistent with Burkean 
conservatism.  Conservatives, he notes, believe in fidelity to institutions, 
traditions, and arrangements that have evolved over time and federalism is 
long-standing aspect of our constitutional architecture.232  Federalism 
allows more readily for experimentation, reform, and incrementalism 
within the framework of existing institutions, which is consistent with the 
conservative’s recognition of the limits of human reason and the 
conservative’s deep skepticism of human capacity for developing ideal 
political and social arrangements (prudent change is therefore necessary 
for preservation).233  And federalism safeguards the liberty of people who 
will attach themselves to diverse political communities, which will serve as 
mediating forces between the individual and the central government.234  To 
this persuasive list, we may add the conservative belief in the value of 
forms in political life.  Forms, as Tocqueville knew, slow the process of 
gratification, the immediate satisfaction of wants which can endanger a 
democratic people.235  As Harvey Mansfield explained, forms give dignity 
and stubbornness to institutions, and create what he calls “constitutional 
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space” between institutions and the people.236  And federalism, he says, 
“gives literal space a constitutional dimension.”237  Of course, belief in 
federalism as a valuable political construct is not the same as judicially 
enforcing it in litigation, but this simply takes us back to the problem of 
judicial review.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The potential for a serious Commerce Clause challenge to many of the 
federal gun possession categories should naturally create some unease 
among those conservatives who want robust gun restrictions (such people 
do exist) in order to address national problems of crime and violence and 
who are simultaneously cautious about the exercise of judicial review.  But 
as important as it is to recognize the connection between the legal and the 
political on the subject of gun control, it is equally important not to unduly 
conflate the two.  Fidelity to constitutional structure, as a conservative may 
view it, trumps fidelity to a particular public policy, where that policy 
would create a constitutional conflict.  That is true of gun policy as well as 
abortion policy.  By the same token, using courts simply as a tool for 
ridding the public law of disfavored policies that conservatives could not 
defeat in the political branches is no better; conservatives have objected to 
such strategies in other areas of constitutional litigation,238 and this 
phenomenon simply reinforces a perception of courts as political 
institutions by another name.239  That is true of gun policy as well as health 
insurance reform policy.  So even conservative defenders of federal gun 
control (they do—and they ought to—exist), as well as those who oppose 
it, must see beyond their preferred legislative agendas.  But in the tradition 
of a conservatism that values the role of states in making and enforcing 
criminal justice policy, pro-gun control conservatives could embrace 
federal criminal powers where appropriate, as well as the limits of the 
Commerce Clause, leaving room for greater gun possession restrictions in 
the states.240  Litigation of federal gun law thus offers the opportunity to 
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witness a compelling intersection of constitutional and ordinary politics.  
And as we undertake a renewed national conversation about crime, guns, 
and the uses of the criminal law, we should remain appropriately mindful 
of those politics. 
